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SUMMARY
The German health care reform of 2004 imposes a charge of e 10 for the first visit to a doctor in each
quarter of the year. At first glance, there is no inhibiting effect of this fee on utilization in the German
Socio-Economic Panel. However, this study reveals that the true effect is diluted by a special characteristic
of the fee. Exploiting random variation in the interview date, this study finds a substantial effect of the new
fee on the probability of visiting a physician. In addition, the identification strategy makes it possible to
disentangle this effect from the influence of the contemporaneous increase of copayments for prescription
drugs.
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1 Introduction
Every insurer tries to implement incentives to avoid excessive claims. This is particularly
important in health insurance markets, where claiming insurance often depends only on
the insured. The first visit to a doctor for a new illness, for instance, is solely a patient’s
decision. Here copayments could be an appropriate instrument to reduce moral hazard.
The introduction and increase of copayments have been important instruments of past
health care reforms in the German statutory health insurance. There are, for instance,
copayments for drugs, hospitalization and doctor visits. These instruments have a direct
fiscal effect because the insurer covers a lower amount. In addition, however, there might
be a reduction in the demand for health care services because the insured avoid excessive
use. Such an inhibiting effect on utilization was also a professed goal of the copayment
for doctor visits which was introduced in Germany in 2004. This study exploits a new
natural experiment which can be used to evaluate the effect of the fee. In contrast to
other research (Augurzky et al., 2006; Schreyögg and Grabka, 2008) this study finds a
significant decline in the probability of visiting a doctor.
According to the OECD (2008), around 90% of the German population are covered by
statutory health insurance (SHI). The regulation of SHI is heavily influenced by govern-
mental decisions. One example is the implementation of a broad health care reform in
2004 which tried to strengthen personal responsibility by increasing copayments. An im-
portant part of this reform was the introduction of copayments for doctor visits. Since
2004 most SHI-insured adults have had to pay e 10 for the first visit to a doctor in a quar-
ter.1 Importantly, these e 10 payments also cover further therapies within this quarter.
So it is a “per-quarter” fee, which is independent of the volume of services rendered in
connection with this or later visits within a quarter. This characteristic distinguishes the
copayment from “per-visit” fees. The effects of a per-visit copayment have already been
analyzed in some studies (Roemer, 1975; Jung, 1998; van de Voorde et al., 2001). Jung
(1998) investigated the effects of implementing such a fee in Korea. He found an impor-
tant decrease in the number of doctor visits and in the probability of seeking medical care.
The effects of a per-quarter copayment, however, should be different because this fee is
1 Children and teenagers up to the age of 18 are exempted from copayments. Moreover, adults
can choose a gate-keeping model. In this case they can avoid the new fee by visiting a general
practioner (GP) first. When more specialised care is required, the patients receive a referral from
this GP. However, it will turn out that the method of this study is unaffected by this potential
self-selection.
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not intended to affect all parts of the distribution. It creates a new incentive to avoid the
first visit to a doctor in a quarter. However, in contrast to a per-visit fee, it generates no
incentives to reduce the number of doctor visits within a quarter once the fee is paid.
Additionally, copayments for prescription drugs have been increased at the same time and
this complicates the evaluation of the copayment for doctor visits. Prior to the reform,
patients had to pay e 4 for small, e 4.50 for medium and e 5 for large package sizes.
Since 2004 it has been a function of the sales price. The patient has had to bear 10% of
the drug price. The copayment amounts at least to e 5 and at most to e 10. The effects
of increasing copayments for prescription drugs on the demand for doctor visits were
extensively investigated by Winkelmann (2004a, 2004b, 2006). He analyzed the influence
of an earlier health care reform implemented in 1997. The most radical element of this
reform was the increase of copayments for prescription drugs (Winkelmann 2004a). All
three studies found a link between the propensity to visit a doctor and copayments for
prescription drugs. Therefore the health care reform of 2004 could affect the behaviour of
health care consumers through both the increased copayments for prescription drugs and
the introduction of copayments for doctor visits. This study, however, shows a method
to disentangle these two effects and to uncover the impact of the copayment for doctor
visits.
There are two studies dealing with the introduction of the e 10 fee. Both are based on
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Augurzky et al. (2006) tried to assess
the effect of the reform on the probability of seeing a physician using a differences-in-
differences approach. They compared statutory health insured participants with privately
insured persons and youths because the latter two groups are exempted from the fee.
Schreyögg and Grabka (2008) applied a similiar estimation strategy. Furthermore, they
used a zero-inflated negative binomial regression to directly model the number of doctor
visits. However, both studies concluded that the copayment for doctor visits had failed
to reduce the demand for doctor visits and argued that this ineffectiveness stems from the
fact that it is a per-quarter fee. This study, however, reveals that this characteristic does
not make the copayment ineffective but is the reason why the effect cannot be observed
in the GSOEP data at first glance.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the natural experiment
which enables the identification of the copayment effect. Section 3 explains the dataset
used in this analysis and the estimation strategy. Section 4 shows that the copayment alters
the observable behavior in the used dataset in a special manner. The effect of the new fee
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can only be observed once the model accounts for the structure of the data. Section 5
concludes.
2 A new natural experiment
The GSOEP is an annual survey started in 1984 which, among other things, includes
a question about the number of visits to a doctor in the last three months before the
interview.2 Thus the observed three months depend on the interview day. The interviews
are conducted every day from January to October. The majority of interviews take place
in the first half of the year. As already mentioned, a special characteristic of the fee is
that it must only be paid at the first visit in a quarter. This characteristic makes it possible
to identify random samples of the SHI-insured population that are differently affected by
the per-quarter fee.
[insert Figure 1 around here]
Two extreme cases of the interview date are indicated by the dots in figure 1. In the first
case (group B) the interview took place at the end of a quarter. Here the respondents
had a full quarter in mind when they answered the question about their number of doctor
visits. In the second case (group A) the interview took place in the middle of a quarter and
the observed three-month period extends over two quarters. Assuming that the interview
day (not necessarily the month) is randomly assigned to each participant, there should be
no differences in the demand for doctor visits between group A and B because you can
observe three months in both groups.3 I argue, however, that the per-quarter copayment
differentially affects the observable behavior in these two groups. Since the reform of
2004 almost all SHI-insured persons in Germany have been confronted with ae 10 hurdle
which vanishes once it is paid by a patient. If the relevant three-month period goes over
two quarters (group A), there is a positive probability that the participant crosses the e 10
hurdle in the unobserved time of the previous quarter - this time is marked by C in figure
1. Thus some members of group A had already paid the fee in the unobserved time C
2 The question reads as follows: Have you gone to a doctor within the last three months? If yes,
please state how often.
3 The interviews are conducted every day. So in the analysis, of course, group A and B do not only
contain these extreme cases. Therefore it is possible to account for seasonal effects and, at least
conditional on season, there should be no differences in the demand for doctor visits. This study
shows strong evidence that the assignment to both groups is indeed random.
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and were therefore unaffected by the copayment in the observed period D. All members
of group B had a full quarter in mind which, of course, was completely influenced by the
fee. So if this copayment works, it will affect group B stronger than group A and this
will lead to a lower demand for doctor visits within group B. A differences-in-differences
approach can be used to uncover this effect.
The accuracy of this method depends on the comparability of the control group to the
treatment group (Besley and Case, 2000). A strong advantage of the above-explained nat-
ural experiment is that both groups are random samples of the SHI-insured population.
Therefore in the absence of the new fee there would be a common trend in both groups,
which is necessary to identify the effect of the copayment. In particular, it is not problem-
atic that copayments for prescription drugs have increased at the same time as thee 10 fee
has been implemented because the control and treatment group are equally affected by the
increased copayments for drugs. Therefore this approach makes it possible to disentangle
the influence of the copayment for doctor visits from the effect of the contemporaneously
increased copayments for drugs. The concentration on SHI-insured persons also causes
a minor disadvantage. This method can only partly identify the effect of copayments for
doctor visits because the control group is also to some extent affected by the new fee.
This study exploits variation in the interview day to identify groups of participants that
are differently affected by copayments for doctor visits. The main idea is to compare the
demand for doctor visits between respondents who had a full quarter in mind (group B)
and those who did not (group A). Two problems arise by constructing an indicator for
group B. Firstly, it cannot be observed exactly which three months the participant had in
mind when he answered the question of the number of doctor visits. But it is very likely
that a person thought of a full quarter if he was interviewed at the end or beginning of a
quarter. Secondly, too few observations are exactly at the end or beginning of a quarter.
Therefore the group B indicator must contain some days around this date. In the following
the variable B indicates all participants who were interviewed at the end of a quarter plus
or minus 10 days. Of course, this assignment leads to some misclassification. A person
interviewed at March 21 might not really have a full quarter in mind. To address this
concern, I also use the distance to the end of a quarter as a continuous measure of the
intensity of treatment and it gives similar results.4
4 Additionally, the results are very similar for different definitions of group B (e.g. +/-5 days). They
are available from the author upon request.
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3 Data and methods
I create a dataset using the GSOEP samples A-F and select a period of four years centered
around the health care reform of 2004.5 The sample includes men and women in the age
of 20 to 60 who have statutory or private health insurance (PHI). The basic estimation
strategy is to pool the data over the four years and evaluate the effect of the copayment on
the probability of at least one visit to a doctor in the observed three months. Generally,
it is possible to analyze the effect on the number of visits using a count data model. For
the purpose of this study, however, a binary outcome model is sufficient because the per-
quarter fee is not intended to influence the frequent users of health services. Persons with
many necessary doctor visits have severe health problems and it is unrealistic that they
would reduce their contacts to zero to avoid paying e 10 per quarter.6 Therefore a probit
model is used to determine the effect of the copayment. The conditional probabilities are
Pr(y ≥ 1|xk,w) = Φ(x′kβk +w′γ)
Pr(y = 0|xk,w) = 1− Φ(x′kβk +w′γ)
(1)
where y is the self-reported number of doctor visits and Φ denotes the cumulative dis-
tribution function of the standard normal distribution. k refers to four different parame-
terizations of the linear index x′β which will be estimated to evaluate the effect of the
new copayment. They will be explained in more detail in the following paragraph. The
vector w stands for other characteristics controlled for in the regressions. It contains
the same variables that are used in Winkelmann (2004a) except for the variable active
sport which measures the frequent participation of an individual in physical activities and
is constructed to act as a further proxy for good health. This variable cannot be used
because there is no corresponding question in the surveys of 2002 and 2006. w thus
includes a second-order polynomial in age, two indicators for self-reported health sta-
tus, three indicators for interview season and employment status. Furthermore, I include
the variables female, years of education, married, household size, welfare recipient and
5 I use the years 2002/03 to observe the behavior before the reform and 2005/06 as post-reform
years. The year 2004 has to be ignored because many interviews in the GSOEP take place in
the first three months and thus the observed three-month period lies partly in the pre- and post-
reform time.
6 Moreover, as already mentioned, persons can commit themselves to visit a GP first. In this case
there are no copayments for doctor visits. Patients who must visit their physicians very often may
use this option.
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household income. In addition to the indicators for interview season, w contains a third-
order polynomial in interview day (coded from 1 to 360) to account more precisely for
seasonal effects.
The probit model will be estimated using different parameterizations. A current method
to evaluate health care reforms in Germany is to compare privately and statutorily insured
persons within a differences-in-differences approach. In this case x′kβk is
x′1β1 = β1,1after + β1,2SHI + β1,3after * SHI (2)
where the variable after indicates the post-reform years and the variable SHI is an indi-
cator whether a person is SHI-insured. The interaction between after and SHI denotes
a statutorily insured observation after the reform. This estimation strategy supposes a
single interaction effect in the overall sample. However, this study reveals two groups
of SHI-insured participants in the GSOEP reacting differently to the new copayment. If
each participant is randomly assigned to one of these groups, the following approach can
be used to estimate the different interaction effects
x′2β2 = β2,1after + β2,2SHI + β2,3after * SHI * (1-B) + β2,4after * SHI * B (3)
where the variable B indicates the group of participants that were interviewed at the end
of a quarter. In this case the observed period is a quarter. As a result, only in this group are
all members fully affected by the per-quarter fee. The assumption of a single interaction
effect can be rejected once β2,4 is significantly different from β2,3. Furthermore a greater
decrease over time in the probability of visiting a doctor in group B than in group A shows
the effectiveness of the copayment.
A simpler empirical strategy that makes it possible to evaluate the copayment is to use
only SHI-insured observations and estimate the decline in demand at the highest intensity
of treatment. In this case x′kβk is
x′3β3 = β3,1after + β3,2I + β3,3after * I (4)
where I measures the intensity of treatment. If it is coded as an inverse measure, the value
zero indicates observations that are most strongly affected by thee 10 copayment and β3,1
identifies the decline in demand within this group. One such inverse measure is the group
A indicator. Additionally, it is possible to identify the decline by a continuous measure
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of the intensity of treatment. Let t measure the distance to the nearest end of a quarter in
days. Thus participants who are interviewed t days before or after the end of a quarter get
the same value. The logarithm of (t+1) is used as a continuous measure of the intensity of
treatment.
In both cases β3,2 is expected to be zero because there should be no differences in the
demand for doctor visits between different intensities in the absence of the treatment,
whereas −β3,3 identifies the effect of the copayment for doctor visits.
4 Results
Table 1 shows that the new copayment alters the observable behaviour of the SHI-insured
persons in the GSOEP in a special manner. It displays the means for the years before
and after the reform grouped by whether or not the respondents were interviewed at the
end of a quarter. Interestingly, after the reform the share of respondents with at least one
doctor visit is distinctly lower when participants were interviewed at the end of a quarter
compared to the second group of interviews which took place sometime in the middle
of a quarter. This is, however, not the case before the reform. In both groups 64% visit
their doctor at least once in three months before the reform. The probability decreases to
61.6% in group B after the reform, whereas it stays unchanged at around 64% in group
A. The group means for the other variables are almost identical which gives some first
evidence for the random assignment to one of both groups.
[insert Table 1 around here]
Table 2 displays the estimates of the probit regressions that compare the privately and the
statutorily insured persons. Most effects are very similiar to those found in Winkelmann
(2004a). The probability of visiting a doctor is u-shaped in age and women are more likely
to see a physician than men. The effects of education and household size are larger in this
study and married persons are somewhat more likely to visit a physician in Winkelmann’s
sample. The estimation strategy in the first column is simply a differences-in-differences
approach conditional on covariables. According to these estimates, the reform only leads
to a slight decrease in the probability of visiting a physician in the group of SHI-insured
persons and a part of this decline stems from the insignificant increase in the control
group. These results are in line with previous research which concluded that copayments
for doctor visits had failed to reduce the demand for doctor visits (Augurzky et al., 2006;
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Schreyögg and Grabka, 2008). However, this conclusion changes once the coefficient of
the interaction term can vary between group A and B (compare column 2). In this model
there is a strong and significant effect in group B but no significant decline in group A.
The corresponding coefficients are significantly different at the 1%-level.7 The model in
the first column is inappropriate to evaluate the copayment for doctor visits. It assumes
a single reform effect in the sample, while there are two groups in the GSOEP that react
differently to the new fee and the majority of statutorily insured persons is in group A
(compare Table 1). The true reform effect which can be observed only at the end of a
quarter is thus diluted in the simpler model.
[insert Table 2 around here]
The control group in table 2 consists of privately insured persons. According to both
regressions, the probability that a privately insured person visits a physician is not signifi-
cantly influenced by time. Therefore estimations with only SHI-insured observations lead
to similar conclusions about the effectiveness of the copayment for doctor visits. In the
following, this sample will be used to evaluate the decline in demand for doctor services.
[insert Table 3 around here]
According to the estimates in the first column of table 3, there is a small but significant
decrease in the probability of visiting a physician. It is, however, questionable to inter-
pret this as a causal effect because identification is simply achieved by comparing the
demand for doctor visits over time. Thus the decline in demand could also be caused by
other events that occured concurrently. This is particularly important with respect to the
increased copayments for drugs. Unlike the regression in the first column, the models
in the second and third column allow one to disentangle the influence of the copayment
for doctor visits from the effect of the increased copayments for drugs. This is achieved
by comparing the decline in demand over time between groups of participants that have
statutory health insurance but are differently affected by copayments for doctor visits.
According to the estimates in the second column of table 3, there is no difference be-
tween group A and B in the probability of visiting a physician prior to the reform. This
is the expected result if the interview day is randomly assigned to each participant. After
7 A more general model would allow all coefficients to vary between group A and B. The estimates
of β2,3 and β2,4 are, however, almost the same in this model. In addition, a likelihood ratio test
cannot reject the parsimonious model from (3) against the more general specification.
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the reform, however, the probability that an individual with given characteristics visits a
doctor is significantly lower if he was interviewed at the end of a quarter (i.e. he belongs
to group B) compared to the remaining sample. The difference between both groups af-
ter the reform stems from the fact that all members of group B were completely affected
by the introduction of the copayment, whereas some members of group A visited their
physician in the unobserved time of the previous quarter and were thus partly exempted
from the fee in the observed three months. Since both groups are random samples of the
SHI-insured population, they are, on average, equally affected by time-varying influences
apart from the introduction of the copayment. The significantly stronger decline in group
B is therefore solely caused by the copayment for doctor visits. Based on this model
the average differences-in-differences adds up to around -3.4%. Applying the continuous
measure of the intensity of treatment leads to similar results (compare column 3).
[insert Figure 2 around here]
Figure 2 shows the relation between the average marginal effect of after and the distance
to the end of a quarter for the discrete and continuous measure. In both cases there is a
strong and equally sized effect at the end of the quarter but this effect diminishes with
increasing distance to the end of a quarter or with decreasing intensity of treatment, re-
spectively.
This study reveals a significant decline in the probability of visiting a physician due to the
copayment whereas there is no study showing an effect in the positive part of the number
of doctor visits.8 This suggests an interesting policy implication. To the extent that the
number of doctor visits represents the necessity of the visits, it reveals a stronger effect
of the copayment on patients with minor illnesses. Persons who frequently have to visit a
physician might choose the gate-keeping model to avoid the new copayment.
A crucial question in this study is whether the distance to the end of a quarter was ran-
domly assigned to each participant. The smoothness of figure 2a and 2b gives some
first evidence for the random assignment. If there were considerable differences in the
distribution of the covariables within each value of t, there would be visible peaks in
both figures. Moreover, the conditional differences-in-differences in the probability of at
least one visit to a physician is around -3.4%, which is very similar to the unconditional
differences-in-differences of -2.6% (compare Table 1). This means that the effect in the
unconditional probabilities cannot be explained by differences in any variable included in
8 I also find no convincing evidence for such an effect of the copayment for doctor visits.
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the model. Finally, employing the identification idea in the absence of the e 10 fee does
not reveal any differences in the demand for doctor visits between different intensities of
treatment. These points together give strong evidence for the random assignment.
5 Discussion
This study exploits variation in the interview date to assess the inhibiting effect of a per-
quarter copayment for doctor visits on utilization. This approach is appealing because it
compares random samples of the SHI-insured population that are differentially affected
by the per-quarter fee. A differences-in-differences regression, therefore, makes it possi-
ble to disentangle the influence of the new copayment from potential macro effects. In
particular, it disentangles the influence of the e 10 copayment from the effect of the con-
temporaneous increase of copayments for drugs. An important contribution of this study
is to show the necessity of comparing full quarters before and after the reform to assess
the effect of the copayment for doctor visits in Germany.
Since the introduction of the fee there have been two groups in the GSOEP. On the one
hand, there are the participants who had a full quarter in mind when they answered the
question about their number of doctor visits in the last three months. Only members of
this group were completely affected by the copayment for doctor visits. As a result the
true effect can be observed in this group. On the other hand, there are the remaining
participants who had a three-month period in mind which extended over two quarters.
In this group some participants crossed the e 10 hurdle in the unobserved time of the
previous quarter and were thus partly unaffected by the copayment for doctor visits in
the observed three months. The majority of observations in the GSOEP are in the latter
group and therefore the true effect of the copayment is diluted in a model which assumes
a single reform effect in the overall sample.
This study overcomes this problem by accounting for the structure of the data. It reveals
that the probability of visiting a physician is significantly influenced by the implementa-
tion of copayments for doctor visits. The effect is about -3.4%, whereas there seems to
be no effect in the positive part of the distribution. This result gives some evidence for a
stronger effect of the copayment on patients with minor ailments.
11
References
Augurzky B, Bauer TK, Schaffner S. 2006. Copayments in the German health system -
Do they work? RWI : Discussion Papers 43.
Besley T, Case A. 2000. Unnatural experiments? Estimating the incidence of endogenous
policies. The Economic Journal 110(467): 672–694.
Jung KT. 1998. Influence of the introduction of a per-visit copayment on health care use
and expenditures: The Korean experience. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 65(1):
33–56.
OECD. 2008. OECD Health Data 2008. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development: Paris.
Roemer MI, Hopkins CE, Carr L, Gartside F. 1975. Copayments for ambulatory care:
Penny-wise and pound-foolish. Medical Care 13(6): 457–466.
Schreyögg J, Grabka MM. 2008. Copayments for ambulatory care in Germany: A natural
experiment using a difference-in-difference approach. SOEPpapers 96.
van de Voorde C, van Doorslaer E, Schokkaert E. 2001. Effects of cost sharing on physi-
cian utilization under favourable conditions for supplier-induced demand. Health Eco-
nomics 10(5): 457–471.
Winkelmann R. 2004a. Health care reform and the number of doctor visits - An econo-
metric analysis. Journal of Applied Econometrics 19(4): 455–472.
Winkelmann R. 2004b. Co-payments for prescription drugs and the demand for doctor
visits - Evidence from a natural experiment. Health Economics 13(11): 1081–1089.
Winkelmann R. 2006. Reforming health care: Evidence from quantile regressions for
counts. Journal of Health Economics 25(1): 131–145.
12
Figure 1: Relationship between interview day and intensity of treatment (two
extreme cases)
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(a) Discrete measure
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(b) Continuous measure
Figure 2: Marginal effect of after (averaged by t) vs. distance to the end of a
quarter
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2002 & 2003 2005 & 2006
At least one doctor visit 0.640 0.616
0.640 0.642
Age 39.77 40.36
39.94 40.65
Female 0.532 0.548
0.534 0.543
Education in years 11.75 12.01
11.82 11.90
Good health 0.581 0.545
0.561 0.547
Bad health 0.130 0.128
0.131 0.138
Observations 3,680 3,430
19,664 16,770
Only SHI-insured observations are used (Group B / Group A).
Table 1: Group means before and after reform
14
Age / 10 -0.3025 -0.3022
(0.0520) (0.0520)
Age2/10 0.0038 0.0038
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Female 0.3842 0.3842
(0.0169) (0.0169)
Education / 10 0.2191 0.2194
(0.0322) (0.0322)
Married 0.0849 0.0851
(0.0187) (0.0187)
Household size -0.0719 -0.0720
(0.0069) (0.0069)
Good health -0.4621 -0.4624
(0.0150) (0.0150)
Bad health 0.6127 0.6127
(0.0256) (0.0256)
Welfare recipient -0.0415 -0.0421
(0.0389) (0.0389)
Ln(income) 0.1076 0.1083
(0.0170) (0.0170)
After 0.0260 0.0246
(0.0337) (0.0337)
SHI 0.0913 0.0919
(0.0293) (0.0293)
After x SHI -0.0673
(0.0356)
After x SHI x (1-B) -0.05451
(0.0358)
After x SHI x B -0.12861
(0.0414)
Log-Likelihood -29,806.86 -29,802.60
Observations 49,326 49,326
Dependent variable: at least one doctor visit in three months.
Models also account for seasonal effects and employment status.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
1 The estimates are significantly different at the 1%-level.
Table 2: Results of pooled probit regressions using observations with statutory or
private health insurance.
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After -0.0419 -0.1249 -0.1218
(0.0133) (0.0318) (0.0505)
A -0.0301
(0.0248)
After x A 0.0985
(0.0345)
Ln(t+1) -0.0017
(0.0128)
After x Ln(t+1) 0.0260
(0.0160)
Log-Likelihood -26,187.11 -26,182.55 -26,185.01
Observations 43,544 43,544 43,544
Dependent variable: at least one doctor visit in three months.
Models contain all covariables. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3: Results of pooled probit regressions using only observations with statu-
tory health insurance.
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